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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7813

DON JESSE NEAL,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Don Jesse Neal, the defendant and appellant herein, was
found guilty by a jury of the crime of murder in the first
degree. The verdict was without recommendation and the
judgment and sentence of the court entered thereon was that
he be shot to death. He now appeals that conviction. The
factual narrative in appellant's brief is substantially accurate
and complete and while in certain instances the evidence has
been presented in a light most favorable to the defendant, it

3
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is felt that no useful purpose would be served by making
an independent recitation of the facts at this time. However,
where deemed necessary, certain essential evidentiary facts
have been set forth in detail in the argument.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF THE
CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY AND SUSTAINS THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT.
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE
BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE.
III. THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREJU, DICIAL.
IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING SENTENCE ON DEFENDANT IN ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL.
V. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO DENY A MOTION FOR THE EXAMINATION OF
DESIGNATED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE NOR A lviOTION
FOR A REHEARING OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
VI. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
OFFICER CLARK OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
4
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DEMONSTRATE THE MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS
WHICH WERE HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIS BACK.
VII. THE DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED A FAIR
TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF THE
CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY AND SUSTAINS
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT.
In prosecuting this appeal appellant in Point I and in
portions of Points VI and IX challenges the legal sufficiency
of the evidence upon which his conviction was based. Such a
challenge was first made when a motion to dismiss the Information was interposed and denied. The motion was founded
solely upon the claim that the State had failed to prove its case
because purportedly there was no evidence that the killing
was· the willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated design of the defendant. The rule applicable however when a
motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence was laid down by this Court in State v. Thatcher, 108
Utah 63, 157 P2d 258 as follows:
The rule which must be applied upon a motion to
dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable inferences

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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are to be taken in favor of the state, and only if the
record itself reveals that no reasonable man could draw
an inference of guilt therefrom is the trial court justified in taking the case from the jury.
In applying the foregoing rule in this case the trial court could
properly have done only what it did do in denying the motion
to dismiss.
A challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence was
again made when an exception was taken to the giving of Instruction 11 in which the court defined the crime of murder
in the first degree. The exception was taken for no other
reason than that again purportedly there was no evidence to
warrant any instruction defining that degree of murder. By
inference and innuendo it was argued then as now, first that
the defendant did not do the shooting and second that even
if he did it occurred during a scuffle and so could not have been
the result of a deliberate and premeditated design to kill and
hence not murder in the first degree. Assuming, arguendo, that
a scuffle did precede the shooting, it does not follow, as is
argued by appellant, that the resulting killing could not be
the result of a deliberate and premeditated design to kill and
hence not murder in the first degree. There is no authority
to support such a theory. Whether there is or is not a deliberate
and premeditated design to kill in such a case must be determined from an analysis of all the surrounding circumstances
and like all doubtful questions of issuable fact is properly
a question for the jury. See State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116,
145 P2d 1003 and State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170
P2d 153. A careful analysis of all the surrounding circumstances
in this case leads to the inescapable conclusion that the killing
6
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was the wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated act
of the defendant.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that immediately prior
to the shooting the deceased was driving the defendant to the
police station. While certain witnesses did testify that as the
car proceeded through the Third South and State Street intersection there appeared to be some kind of a scuffle or a
locking of shoulders by the defen~nt and the deceased or a
movement by the defendant closer a-Qd closer to the deceased,
the record is entirely void of any evidence indicating the
slightest provocation or justification for the shooting. \Vith
cool and collected mind the defendant shot the deceased as
the deceased was driving him to the police station. The surrounding circumstances pointedly reveal that the defendant,
without provocation, justification or exCll.Se, had the choice to
shoot or not to shoot. Having made the choice to shoot under
such circumstances any other conclusion but that the resulting
killing was the deliberate and premeditated design of the
defendant would be untenable.
Finally it is respectfully submitted that appellant apparently is not serious about pressing the assignments of error
which challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence because
at page 16 of his brief it is conceded that there is not a lack
of evidence upon which the verdict of the jury can be sustained. If, as appellant concedes, the evidence does sustain
the verdict, it was proper to submit the question of first degree murder to the jury in the first instance. Furthermore it
necessarily follows that the judgment of the court based upon
that verdict is also sustained by that same evidence.
7
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POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE INCRMINATING STATEMENTS MADE
BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE.
It is urged that the trial court committed error in admitting in evidence certain incriminating statements made by
the defendant shortly after the shooting and as he was fleeing
from the scene. There is ]>( denial that the statements were
made. The sole contentidh is that they should not have been
admitted because they were not part of the res gestae.

While there is nothing in the record to reveal the precise ·
amount of time which transpired from the time of the shooting until the statements were made it could have been but a
very few minutes at most. Immediately after the shooting
the defendant left the DeSoto Sedan in which he ~nd the
deceased had been riding, ran across the street and boarded a
bus at the intersection of Third South and State Streets. One
of the incriminating statements was made as the bus approached the intersection of Fourth South and State Streets
which was only one block away and the other was made at
the A & W Drive Inn located only one additional block south
near the intersection of Fifth South and State Streets. Under
the circumstances there can be little doubt concerning the
spontaneity of the utterances made by the defendant.
The determination as to what acts or utterances are admissible as part of the res gestae is not one which can be made
by any arbitrary rule of thumb. As stated in Jones "Commentaries on Evidence," Second Edition, Sec. 1204:
8
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It is impractical to fix, by general rule, any instant
of time at which it may be said to be too late for an
act or declaration to be part of the res gestae and
so as to preclude debate and conflict of opinion in
regard to this particular point. So long, however, as
suspicion of fabrication is absent, and no taint of
preconceived action or suggestion of design is present,
the fact that there is a slight interval between the
declaration and the principal transaction, and that they
are not entirely synchronous, does not affect its admissiblity as part of the res ·gestae.
The statements objected to in this else were made as the defendant was fleeing from the scene of the crime and attempting
to perfect his escape. The circumstances under which they
were made do not in the slightest degree indicate "suspicion
of fabrication" or "taint of preconceived action or suggestion
of design." Rather they show up very definitely as the spontaneous uterances of a fleeing felon. To deny their admissibility
in this case would in effect be an attempt to "exclude everything from the res gestae which did not occur on the very
instant of the grinding of the flesh and bones" to borrow a
phrase quoted in Peirce v. VanDusen, 78 Fed. 693, 24 C.C.A.
280; 69 L.R.A. 705.
It is respectfully submitted that not only could the incriminating statements of the defendant be properly admitted
in evidence as part of the res gestae but also that they could
be properly admitted as admissions by the accused. In Warren
on Homicide, Permanent Edition, Vol. 2, page 651, the rule
with reference to admissions is set forth as follows:

A statement by the defendant amounting to an admission, subsequent to the killing, is admissible to show
that the defendant committed the crime .

9
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In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Tenth Edition, Sec. 622a,
page 1266, the rule is stated in the folowing language:
. . . admissions are always admissible in evidence
under an exception to the rule excluding hearsay evidence, provided such admissions are made against interest ...
See also 20 Am. Jur. 473.
The incriminating statements made by the defendant
shortly after the shooting and as he was fleeing from the scene
of the homicide were properly admitted by the trial court
either as part of the res gestae or as admissions by the accused.

POINT III
THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT
BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Appellant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing the District Attorney over objection
to question the defendant about various crimes for which he
had neither been accused nor convicted. This objection harks
to the very nature of the admissibility of all evidence. In State
v. Scott et al., 111 Utah 9, ( 175 P2d 1016) at page 20, the
court states:
The basic rule of admissibility of evidence is that
all evidence having probative value - that is, that
tends to prove an issue, is admissible.
This proposition is echoed in Wigmore Volume 1, Sec. 10,
page 293:
10
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The second axiom on which our law of Evidence
rests is this: All facts having rational probative value
are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids.
Certainly, a criminal act may be a fact, relevant to, and probative of an issue.
In addition one should remember a second fundamental
idea as expressed by Wigmore Volume 1, Section 13, page 299:
It constantly happens that a fact which is inadmissible for one purpose is admissible for, other purposes

***
And, as clarified on page 300:
In other words, when an evidentiary fact is offered
for one purpose, and bceomes admissible by satisfying
all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it is not
inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity and because the
jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity.
The appellant asserts "that the commission of the offense for which a person is on trial cannot be proved by evidence
that such person committed another but independent offense."
Certainly there is no dispute with this proposition if it means
that the prior offenses are inadmissible as evidence for the
purpose of showing a disposition to commit offenses, and
thence the commission of a particular wrong. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Edition 11, Volume 1, Section 262 at page 322,
states:

* * * other offenses are inadmissible when offered
for the purpose of proving the crime charged, or to
show that the defendant would be likely to commit the
crime with which he is charged. * * *
11
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But it is fundamentally in error to assert, as many have
done, that if a party is charged with a specific crime, no evidence of the commission by him ,of another crime or wrong
is receivable against him. As Wharton, supra, states in the
completion of the above quoted paragraph:

* * * the evidence of other crimes is admissible to
show motive, and, where relevant for this purpose,
the admissibility is not affected by th fact that such
evidence may prove other crimes. (Emphasis added).
See also Wigmore on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 217.
Wharton, Section 345, page 490, sets forth the general rule:
In certain classes of cases collateral offenses may
be shown to prove the mental processes or mental attitude of the accused. This includes five different things:
( 1) Motive * * * (2) intent * * * (3) absence of
accident or mistake * * * (4) identity * * * (5) a
common scheme or plan * * *
State v. Scott, supra, adopts rule 311 of the Model Code
of evidence which states:
Subject to Rule 306 [rule as to character evidence],
evidence that a person committed a crime or civil
wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible as tending
to prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong on
another occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant
solely as tending to prove his disposition to commit
such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil
wrongs generally.
Therein, the court tracing the history of the rule (viewing
it as a narrow exception to a broad rule of admissibility or as
an exception to a broad rule of exclusion) states:
12
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* * * Exceptions which are mentioned in the cited
cases are: if the evidence tends to show intent or
motive, if it indicates the offense was not due to accident or mistake, * * * (Emphasis added).
See also the comment in the Model Code of Evidence, page 196:

* * * nothing is more common than to find the
unqualified asertion that if a party is charged with
having committed a specified crime or civil wrong, no
evidence of the commission by him of another crime
or wrong is receivable against him. This is true where
the series of inferences on which the relevance of
the evidence depends is from the commission of the
other wrong to a disposition to commit such a wrong
or to commit crimes or torts generally, thence to the
commission of the particular wrong. The cases are
legion, however, which admit such evidence when offered to prove motive, intent, preparation, plan or
identity. (Emphasis added.)
In State v. DeWeese, 51 Utah 515, 172 P 290, an interesting and bizarre murder case, an autobiography of the accused,
listing prior crimes of which he had never been accused or
convicted, was introduced and received in evidence. Defendant
objected generally and the specific objection was that "proof
of the other crimes not tending to prove the crime for which
he was being tried only tended to prejudice him in the tninds
of the jury." The paper was admitted and upon defendant's
motion, the judge charged the jury "that they were permitted
to consider the burglaries solely upon the question of motive."
Therein there was a thorough discussion of the authorities
and the court stated in 51 Utah, page 53 3:

* * * None of the authorities referred to dispute
the proposition that proof of other crimes, whether
IS
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similar or dissimilar, connected or unconnected, may
be admitted to prove a motive for the specific crime
for which the defendant is being tried. (Emphasis
added).
The court on page 53 5 recognizes the danger of such evidence
and states:

* * * We admit the danger of permitting evidence
of other crimes than the one specifically charged against
the defendant, and that such evidence should be admitted with great caution and circumspection, for the
tendency to prejudice a defendant in such cases is
admittedly great; but when the evidence is relevant,
as in this case, to prove motive, as we think we have
shown, then it is admissible by all of the authorities
with which we are familiar. (Emphasis added).
The above quoted authorities sustain the proposition that
evidence of prior criminal acts of which one has never been
charged or convicted may be admissible in evidence for the
limited purpose of showing motive. See also State v. Bowen,
43 Utah 111 at 114; State v. Kappas et al., 100 Utah 274, 114
P2d 205; State v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191 P2d 142; and
State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, as having some bearing. 60
C.J.S. at page 86, in a discussion of motive, states:

* * * Motive has to do wholly with desire, and probably a motive does not operate to influence positive
action unless there are facts in existence which create
the motive.
Wigmore, Volume II, Section 390, page 331 and following,
states:
The circumstances which might excite a desire to
kill are innumerable. * * * Among the instances most
14
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commonly offered for ajudication, the following may
be noted:

* * * The expediency of preventing the discovery
of a former crime, or of evading an arrest or a prosecution for it, may lead to the desire to kill.
It is commonplace that the existence of a fact may be
proved in one of two ways or both; ( 1) through extrinsic records or testimony or ( 2) by eliciting from the mouth of the
accused on cross-examination the existence of certain facts.
A close perusal of the cross-examination by the district attorney shows an effort, not to make out accused as an habitual
criminal as appellant would have you believe, but to get from
the accused himself testimony as to his own past actions, his
own knowledge, his own state of mind. In short, the district
attorney sought to establish certain facts, from which one
may reasonably infer, the motive for murder-the desire to
escape. The whole line of cross examination was designed to
show motive, and was in fact successful in establishing certain
important facts from which motive could be inferred.

Q. Well, you knew that they wanted you for stealing
payroll checks from the Alamo Cleaners in California, didn't you?
A. Yes (R. 290).

Q. And you said that you had stolen some Alamo
Cleaners checks? (R. 294).
A. Yes, sir.

Q. You knew also, did you, at the time that you were
leaving, that there would be not only that, (referring to parole violation) but there would be fortyseven counts of forgery if they saw fit to press them,
didn't you? (R. 299).
15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Yes, it's one to fourteen (R. 300).
Q. What's that?
A. Term is one to fourteen on that.
Q. For one count of forgery?
A. Yes, and they usually run them c.c. since my restitution. It's not enough to do this thing about.
Q. Well, in other words, there would have been another fourteen years at least?
A. One to fourteen, yes, sir.
Q. And you were very anxious to keep away from any
law enforcement officers, weren't you, when you
were ging to Reno ?
A. Well, that's natural, yes, sir.
Questions were put concerning parole violations, tying in with
the questions concerning the stealing and forging of checks.
Q. And you knew that that was a violation of your
parole, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir, but not a serious violation (R. 290).
Q. I think last night, Mr. Neal, that you said that you
didn't know that you had violated your parole. Is
that right? (R. 294).
A. No, sir.
After having him admit that the forgeries were parole
violations (R. 294), defendant admitted (R. 295) he knew his
parole board would be considering his forgeries as a parole
violation.
Q. The possession by you of a gun would have violated your parole, wouldn't it? (R. 298) .
A. Yes, sir.
16
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Q. And you bought the gun and kept it, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
The defendant indicated he knew that he would have four
years to serve for parole violation (R. 299).

Q. Now, when you parked the car here on Tuesday
night, you figured that the car would be hot, didn't
you? (R. 302).
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, of course, you were very anxious to escape,
weren't you, this officer when he got you? (R. 289).
A. Anybody would beThe three questions objected to by appellant were merely
additional efforts to elicit from the mouth of the accused facts
which one could add to the other evidence of motive. The district attorney was successful in eliciting the fact of the Alamo
robbery and the perpetration of certain forgeries. Also, the
parole violations. These were established by the admissions
of the accused without specific objection by appellant's attorney.
The district attorney was unsuccessful in gaining admissions
concerning certain other robberies. The mere fact that the
district attorney failed to put in evidence to contradict the negative answers of defendant and in addition to add to the admitted facts from which we can reasonably infer a motive for
murder was not prejudicial. The court, further, tempered the
effect of such evidence by giving a limiting instruction in Instruction 7 which states:
There has also been received evidence tending to
show that the defendant has committed other felonies
17
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for which he has not been convicted. This evidence may
be considered by you only in connection with whether
or not the defendant had a motive to kill Owen T.
Farley (R. 21).
The cross examination of the district attorney when so
safeguarded, was not prejudicial.

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING SENTENCE ON DEFENDANT IN ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL.
Point VIII of appellant's brief states that "the court
erred in imposing sentence on the defendant in the absence
of defendant's counsel." To sustain such a contention, the
appellant relies on the constitution, a statute, and one case,
all of which assert a fundamental legal proposition that in
original prosecutions the accused may "appear and defend in
person and by counsel." While the authorities quoted, without
dispute, sustain the proposition asserted, a more pointed inquiry
and the real issue in question, is whether the presence of counsel
at the time of the imposition of sentence is included within
that fundamental right.
On that point, there is some division of opinion. The cases
go three ways. Group one goes off on the idea that an accused
is entitled to assistance of counsel at "trial" that the "imposition of sentence" is after the trial and that counsel is not
required at that time. State v. Hughes, 170 La. 1063, 129
So. 63 7 states·: "It is not essential to the validity of a sentence
18
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that the attorney for the defendant shall be present when
sentence is pronounced; for the sentence is not part of the
proceedings which constitute trial according to articles 332,
333 and 334 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." (A statute
very similar to Utah statute, 105-32-1 Utah Code Annotated
1943, designating the order of trial.) See also Ex Parte Oliver,
____ Texas ----· 240 S. W. 2d 316, a 1951 Texas case with peculiar facts where sentence is not pronounced until the conviction has been determined on appeal, and the pronouncement
of sentence is not considered to be part of the trial.
Group two is made up generally of a number of federal
cases which indicate that the right to counsel extends to all
stages of the original proceedings. Thomas v. Hunter, 153
F2d 834, states:

•

To hold that the return of the verdict into court
and sentence thereafter is not part of the trial is to
accord the term "trial" a very narrow and technical
definition-too narrow a definition when the question
under consideration is the violation of human rights
and liberty guaranteed by the constitution.
See also Wilfong v. Johnston, C.C.A. 9th, 156 F2d 507;
Martin v. U. S., 182 F2d 225; People v. Fields, 198 P2d 104;
and the basic statement in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45,
that an accused has a right to the guiding hand of counsel at
every stage of the proceedings. Also Coates v. Lawrence, 46
F. Supp. 414, 416, that "a person accused of crime is entitled
to assistance of counsel at all stages of trial including sentence."
On the very point in issue, the federal cases point up
the reason for the assistance of counsel at the time when
19
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sentence is to be imposed. In Martin v. U. S., 182 F2d 225
(at 227), the court says:

•

The very nature of the proceeding at the time of
imposition of sentence makes the presence of defendant's counsel at that time necessary if the constitutional
requirement is to be met. There is then a real need
for counsel. The advisibility of an appeal must then,
or shortly, be determined. Then is the opportunity afforded for presentation to the courts of facts in extenuation of the offense, or in explanation of defendant's
conduct; to correct any errors or mistakes in reports
of defendant's past record; and, in short to appeal to
the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement of penal laws. Any judge with trial experience must acknowledge that such disclosures frequently
result in mitigation, or even suspension of penalty.
(Emphasis added.)
In Batson v. U. S., 137 F2d 288, as a matter of dictum, the
court states:

* * * VIe believe that an accused should have the
opportunity to be heard by counsel on the sentence to
be imposed, and that a court should not impose sentence
in the absence of counsel without expressly ascertaining that defendant does not desire his presence. Many
considerations influence the length of a sentence which
is to be imposed, and a defendant should have the opportunity to have his attorney present any mitigating
circumstances to the court for its consideration in determining the weight of the sentence. (Emphasis added).
The third group of cases comprises a hybrid group where
the absence of counsel was not considered prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Polens, 327 Pa. 544, 194 A. 652; Kent v. San20
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ford, Warden 121 F2d 216; Lovvorn v. Johnston, 118 F2d
704; McGuire v. Hunter, Warden 138 F2d 379; Moore v.
Aderhold, Warden 108 F2d 729.
Assuming that normally the better road for the law to
take in this state is to insist on the presence of counsel at the
time of sentence imposition, the state submits the following:
( 1) The absence of counsel in this particular case in no way
prejudiced the defendant. ( 2) Even if counsel's absence be
. deemed prejudicial, then the case should be remanded .only
for the purpose of resentencing defendant.
In support of contention number one, we refer to 10328-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which states:
Penalty for Murder
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree
shall suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the
jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison
for life, in the discretion of the court. * * * (Emphasis
added.)

State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 P 530, states in essence that
upon the conviction of murder in the first degree this section
gives the jury the discretion to recommend the defendant to
life imprisonment. In the absence of such a recommendation,
the court upon such a conviction is required to impose the
death penalty.
This demonstrates the complete lack of discretion on the
part of the judge in this case. He could only pronounce death.
He could not in any way modify the statutorily described
penalty. This factor distinguishes this case from the many
federal pronouncements which indicate that counsel should
21
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have an opportunity to be heard on the sentence, in order to
introduce mitigating circumstances for the purpose of influencing the discretion of the judge. The judge here can go in but one
direction regardless of statement of counsel.
At the return of the verdict, the attorney may pursue two
possible courses of action. 105-39-3;, Utah Code Annotated
1943, alows a motion for a new trial. 105-35-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, provides for a motion in arrest of judgment.
No motion in arrest of judgment was filed. Motion for a new
trial was filed (R. 338-39), was denied outside presence of
counsel (R. 340), and on the filing of a subsequent motion
for rehearing was heard and denied (R. 346), thereby curing
any defect, if there be any, in not having an opportunity for
oral argument on the original motion for new trial.
Though the action in imposing sentence sans counsel
may have been technically in error, under the circumstance of
this case, neither the "guiding hand of counsel" nor the skilled
advocacy of mitigating circumstances could have· produced
a different result. The judge had an affirmative statutorily
imposed duty. He could do only that which he has aready
done. Defendant has in nowise been prejudiced.
If the court was technically in error, the case should be
remanded only for the purpose of resentencing defendant.
See Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F2d 507 at 510. See also In Re
Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 149.

POINT V
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
22
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DENY A l\IOTION FOR THE EXAJ\HNA TION OF DESIGNATED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE NOR A MOTION FOR
A REHEARING OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Point VI of appellant's brief charges error in denying
( 1) motion for rehearing on motion for new trial and ( 2)
motion for an order requiring examination of designated
physical evidence (R. 346). The foundation of both motions
as indicated in appellant's brief was "newly discovered evidence."
The law concerning newly discovered evidence is well
stated in the case of State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P2d
167. At page 559, the court states:
Newly discovered evidence, to be ground for a new
trial, must satisfy several elementary requirements.
The courts are not in accord respecting all these requirements, but fairly agree that the newly discovered
evidence be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial,
that it be not merely cumulative, that that it be such
as to render a different result probable on the retrial
of the case. Note, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 903'.
And at page 561:

* * * It is the general rule that the granting or refusing of a motion for a new trial rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and that an appellate
court will not disturb its action unless it appears that
this discretion has been abused to the prejudice of the
defendant. 16 C. J. 1119; 20 R. C. L. 290; People v.
Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 502, 86 P. 834. It was the duty
of the trial judge to give careful attention to the affidavit filed in support of the motion and to consider
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it in connection with the evidence given at the trial.
Having had the defendant and the witnesses before him,
he was in a better position than we are to judge of
the probable effect of the testimony now proposed. To
justify him in granting a new trial he should be satisfied that the proffered evidence is such as to render
a different result probable on a retrial of the case.
Note, 46 L.R.A. (N. S.) 903; Perry v. People, 38
Colo. 23, 87 P. 796. Or he might have granted it
had he any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
defendant. People v. Markle, 89 Cal. 82, 26 P. 642.
Before we are authorized to reverse the action of the
trial court and direct the granting of a new trial, it
must appear that the evidence proposed is of such
character, when viewed with the other evidence given on
the trial, as to raise a reasonable presumption that the
result of a second trial would be different from that
in the first and that the trial court had abused its discretion or was manifestly wrong in overruling the
motion. State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815
State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, at 520 states:

* * * In no event, * * * is this so-called newly
discovered evidence "so conclusive in its character as
to raise a reasonable presumption that the result of
a second trial would be different from the first," which
would have to be the case in order to authorize us to
grant a new trial.
In considering the motion for the examination of designated physical evidence, we must note that it is one step removed from the normal concept of newly discovered evidence
-in fact it deals not with newly discovered evidence but with
evidence yet to be discovered and which, in fact, ascertained,
may have no material relationship with the issue in question
24
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and which may not, in all probability, raise a presumption
of a different probable result. The state submits that by the
exercise of due diligence, counsel could have discovered the
sought for evidence prior to trial or during trial by a timely
motion for a continuance. See El Paso Southwestern R. Co.
v. Barrett, 101 S. W. 1025, 1029; 46 Tex. Civ. App. 14. In
the application of the law to the circumstances, we must conclude that the motion's denial was not in error.
In relation to the motion for a new trial on the basis of
Officer Jackson's affidavit (R. 345) evidencing the fact of
a search of Don Neal's car prior to his arrest and the then
disclosure of no secreted weapon, the state submits that due
diligence on the part of counsel would have produced such
evidentiary fact prior to or during trial. Conceding for purposes of argument that due diligence could not have produced
the desired evidence, it is submitted that that evidence when
considered in relation with all of the other evidence, is not
of such a character as to raise a reasonable presumption that
the result of the second trial would be different from that of
the first. If such be true, then the conclusion, of course, follows that the trial court was not in error in exercising its broad
discretion by denying such motion for a re-hearing of the
denial of a motion for a new trial.

POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING OFFICER CLARK OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
25
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DEMONSTRATE THE MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS
WHICH WERE HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIS BACK.
Appellant's Point III relates to a certain demonstration
performed before the jury and detailed on page 238-239 of
the record. Over the general objection of appellant as to its
competency, relevancy and materiality (R. 238) the Court
allowed Officer Harold Clark to sit on an armless chair, hands
handcuffed behind his back, and demonstrate the ability of
a person so situated to move his hands and point a gun. After
the demonstration and after the jury had observed the ability
of one so seated and cuffed to move his hands and point a
gun, the appellant then interposed a specific objection claiming
dissimilarity of conditions between the conditions of the demonstration and the conditions when Officer Farley was shot.
As a preliminary observation it should be borne in mind
that it is elementary in the law that objections should be timely
put and except where proffered evidence is inadmissible for
any purpose, the basis of the objection must be stated with
particularity. See Snowden v. Pleasant Valley Coal Company,
16 Utah 366 and 52 Pac. 599 and Culmer v. Clift, 14 Utah
286.
It is submitted that the objection when first made was
without sufficient particularity to justify the trial court in
excluding the evidence. Likewise, the specific objection made
after the demonstration was not timely put.

Bypassing the argument concerning the timeliness of objections and turning to the substance of the matter we find
that the law relating to experiments is well summarized in
8 A.L.R. 18 and 85 A.L.R. 479. There the cases are collected
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which pertain to experimental evidence as affected by similarity
-or dissimilarity of conditions. From the cases therein cited one
is struck by four fundamental ideas which state the law.
( 1) The conditions present at the demonstration or experiment must be substantially similar to the conditions existing
at the time of the occurrence. ( 2) The limit of permissible
dissimilarity is drawn where such variation is likely to confuse or mislead the jury. (3) The admission of experimental
evidence is peculiarily within the discretion of the trial judge
and will not be interferred with in the absence of abuse. ( 4)
Given essential conditions substantially similar, then any departure of minor variation goes to the weight rather than the
admissibility of the evidence.
A close reading of the record reveals that the demonstration performed by Officer Clark in no wise purported to be
a complete re-enactment, pantomime, or demonstration of
the crime~ It did show that a person sitting down, hands cuffed
behind his back, is not incapable of so moving his hands and
body as to be in a position from which he could shoot a
person. It is submitted that for this purpose that the conditions present at the demonstration were substantially similar
to the conditions existent at the time of the occurrence; that
what dissimilarity existed did not in any way confuse or mislead the jury; that the evidence was properly admitted in the
sound discretion of the court, and the existing variations were
taken into consideration by the jury in its evaluation of the
weight to be given to the demonstration.
POINT VII
THE DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED A FAIR TRIAL.
27
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Analysis of the record reveals that the defendant was
afforded a fair and impartial trial. He was represented by able
and experienced counsel. He had opportunity to present witnesses and confront and cross examine those witnesses presenetd against him. The newspape~ incident referred to in appellant's brief when considered with all the other facts and
circumstances of the case in no way affected the essential
fairness and impartiality of defendant's trial and was acquiesced in by defendant's counsel. The burden of showing
any essential unfairness in connection with the trial has not
been met and it is respectfully submitted that the proceedings
by which the defendant was convicted of the crime of first
degree murder 'are free from prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
A review of the entire proceedings and the law in relation
thereto shows that the defendant, Don Jesse Neal, was afforded
a fair trial in accordance with established legal principles and
that the proceedings were free from prejudcial error. It is
respectfully submitted therefore that the verdict of the jury
and the judgment and sentence of the court should be affirmed
by this Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Assistant Attorney General
BRUCE S. JENKINS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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